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New Developments, Challenges, 
and Prospects 
Ngiam Kee Jin 
Since the late 1960s a number of international financial centers have emerged 
in Asia. These centers  are major meeting  places  for internationally  mobile 
funds. The rapid  economic growth in many Asian countries combined with 
their various stages of economic development has increased the flow of funds 
across countries. This in turn has induced internationally renowned banks to 
establish branches in Asia to facilitate the cross-border flow of funds. Singa- 
pore has had a head start on other Asian centers as it was the first to allow a 
foreign bank to operate an offshore banking unit, as far back as 1968.' This 
unit, also known as the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) or the Asian Dollar Mar- 
ket, was created by removing the withholding tax on interest paid to nonresi- 
dents for the placement of foreign currency deposits.* Since then, other banks 
in Singapore have followed suit by setting up their own ACUs. Like Singapore, 
Hong Kong has gradually evolved into an international financial center. The 
transformation of Hong Kong gained momentum after 1978 when the govern- 
ment lifted its moratorium on the issuance of new banking licenses. In 1986, 
Tokyo set itself up as a global financial center with the establishment of  the 
Japan Offshore Market. Other latecomers in international financial markets are 
Taipei, Bangkok, and Labuan. 
Singapore is currently a major financial center, serving not only its domestic 
economy but also its region and beyond. The financial services provided  by 
Singapore have contributed significantly to its economic development. Over 
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the past seven years, the financial sector has been the best-performing sector 
of the economy, averaging 20 percent growth per annum, or twice the annual 
rate of growth of the entire economy. In  1993, the financial sector grew at 20.8 
percent compared with 9.9 percent for the whole economy. Today, financial and 
business services contribute about one-quarter of the country’s gross domestic 
product. They now constitute a larger sector of the economy than the manufac- 
turing industry. The outlook and future role of Singapore as an international 
financial center are subjects of great interest. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 13.1 analyzes the major develop- 
ments in the Singapore financial scene in recent years. Section 13.2 addresses 
the challenges from the other financial centers in Asia, especially Hong Kong 
and Tokyo. Section 13.3 provides the outlook and future directions for Singa- 
pore as an international financial center. Finally, section 13.4 gives the conclu- 
sions. 
13.1  Recent Developments in Singapore Financial Markets 
The role of  Singapore financial markets as a conduit for the international 
flow of funds is shown schematically in figure 13.1. Global funds can be chan- 
neled through Singapore via either of  two routes: direct finance and indirect 
finance. In indirect finance, lenders and borrowers go through the Asian Dollar 
Market with  the ACUs  acting as intermediaries. A  financial  institution op- 
erating in the Asian Dollar Market must maintain  an ACU separate from its 
domestic banking unit  (DBU). The ACU of  a bank  deals only with  claims 
denominated in non-Singapore currencies and does not need to maintain any 
reserves against deposits. In contrast, the DBU of  a bank deals mainly  with 
deposits and loans denominated in Singapore dollars and has to observe cash 
and liquid reserve requirements.’  In direct finance, borrowers obtain funds di- 
rectly in financial markets by selling claims (equities, Asian commercial paper, 
or Asian dollar bonds) to lenders. The role of the foreign exchange market and 
the Singapore International Monetary Exchange is basically to bind together 
the various segments of the Asian Dollar Market-Eurodollar,  Euroyen, Euro- 
mark, and so forth. 
Recognizing the importance of financial services as an independent growth 
area, various measures were undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s to turn Singa- 
pore into an international financial center. Listed below are some of the con- 
crete steps toward deregulation and 1iberalization:j 
September 1970 
July 1972 
Policy  toward  admission  of  foreign  banks  is  liber- 
Cartel system for fixing exchange rates is abolished. 
alized. 
3. Currently, the minimum cash balance and liquid assets ratio are 6 and 18 percent, respectively, 
4.  For more details, see MAS (1989). 
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Fig. 13.1  Flow of international funds through the Singapore financial system 
July  1973 
August  1973 
July 1975 
June 1978 
March  1987 
Floating of the Singapore dollar is instituted. 
Dealings in the gold market are completely liberalized. 
Cartel system for fixing interest rates is abolished. 
Exchange control is completely liberalized. 
The stockbroking industry  is  opened to local  banks 
and foreign financial institutions. 
Certain regulations are still vigorously enforced by the authorities. The op- 
position of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to the international- 
ization of the Singapore dollar (through limits on lending overseas and bor- 
rowing by nonresidents) is perhaps the most controversial.'  This regulation has 
been defended on the grounds that internationalization  would render the con- 
duct of monetary policy more difficult. The cost is that domestic money and 
capital markets in Singapore will not be fully developed. Prior to  1980, Japan 
similarly had opposed the internationalization  of the yen.h However, as both 
domestic and international pressure increased to open Japan's capital markets, 
the Bank of Japan withdrew its opposition. The large growth of Japanese capi- 
tal markets in the past decade and the rapid progress made in liberalization has 
resulted in wider use of the yen in international transactions. Nothing thus far 
has occurred that would support the fear that Japan  would lose control of its 
money supply. 
5.  Other controversial regulations include the restrictive trading rules of the Stock Exchange of 
6.  For a discussion of the internationalization of  the yen in the carly  1980s. see Frankel (1984). 
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13.1.1  Asian Dollar Market 
Much of Singapore’s growth as an international financial center in the early 
years resulted from the rapid growth of its Asian Dollar Market (ADM), which 
is the Asian counterpart of the Eurodollar market, rather than from the growth 
of  its  domestic  financial  system. The ADM  is  essentially  an  international 
money and capital market in foreign currencies. The major currencies are the 
U.S. dollar, deutsche mark, yen, pound sterling, and Swiss franc. Since its in- 
ception in  1968, the growth rate of the ADM has been phenomenal, as illus- 
trated in figure 13.2. Its current size, as is evident from the value of assets in 
the ACUs, has dwarfed that of  other banking  and financial institutions. As 
shown in table 13.1, the ACUs accounted for 66.2 percent of total assets of the 
financial sector in  1993. This is an enormous jump from the 0.1 percent ac- 
counted for by  the first ACU during its first year of operation. Commercial 
banking activities, while increasing absolutely, constituted only  18.3 percent 
of banking activities in 1993. It is clear that the financial sector has been trans- 
formed from a predominantly domestic operation conducted mainly through 
commercial banks into a global financial market channeled through ACUs. 
The characteristics of ACUs have undergone some significant changes over 
the years. As shown in table 13.2, the share of funds going to nonbank custom- 
ers rose to 35.4 percent in 1992 from 25.3 percent in 1976.’ The share of in- 
terbank lending, while still dominant, declined from 72.7 percent in  1976 to 
55.5 percent in 1992. The composition of  the sources of funds has remained 
relatively constant, although deposits of  nonbank  customers have increased 
marginally at the expense of interbank deposits.* Interbank deposits predomi- 
nate, accounting for 80.0 percent  of  total funds in  1992. Most of these in- 
terbank deposits come from outside Singapore. 
Although statistics on the sources and uses of  ACU funds by  country or 
region are confidential, a few salient features can be deduced from published 
works. According to Bryant (1989), Singapore was a net creditor to the rest of 
the world as it had a positive net claim (total external assets exceeding total 
external liabilities) against all other countries. Singapore has always been a net 
creditor to the other Asia-Pacific region economies (including Hong Kong) but 
a net debtor vis-A-vis Europe and the Middle East. With the rapid development 
in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, Singapore might have played an even 
larger role as a net creditor to China and the ASEAN countries since 1987. In 
its first annual report, in 1993, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority reported 
that the colony borrowed some S$24 billion from Singapore in 1993 compared 
with about S$20 billion in 1992. One factor might be that Singapore residents 
were placing their funds in Hong Kong rather than Singapore to avoid paying 
7. Nonbank borrowers include multinational corporations, Singapore companies, and foreign 
8. Nonbank depositors include nonresident private individuals, multinational corporations, and 
governments. 
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Fig. 13.2  Growth of the financial sector in Singapore (ACU and DBU assets) 
Source: Annual Report (Singapore: MAS, various issues). 












60  (0.1) 
3,674  (74.2) 
43  (0.1) 
- 
540  (10.9) 
431  (8.7) 
199  (4.0) 
4,947  ( 100) 
- 
1980 
113,870  (64.5) 
33,316 (18.4) 
13,300  (7.4) 
2,757  (1.5) 
9,551  (5.3) 
950  (0.5) 
3,075  (1.7) 
1,242  (0.7) 
I78,06  I  ( 100) 
1985 
327,062  (68.9) 
70,618 (14.9) 
28,207  (5.9) 
9,193  (1.9) 
26,834  (5.7) 
2,469  (0.5) 
6,936  (1.5) 
3,527  (0.7) 
474,846  ( 100) 
1993 
616,143  (66.2) 
170,250 (18.3) 
42,205  (4.5) 
20,310  (2.2) 
52,334  (5.6) 
14,994  (1.6) 
14,470  (1.6) 
930,706 (100) 
- 
Source: Annual Report (Singapore: MAS, various issues). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. 
"The figures for ACUs are converted from U.S. dollars to Singapore dollars using the yearly aver- 
age exchange rate given in the MAS Annual Reports. 364  Ngiam Kee Jin 
Table 13.2  Uses and Sources of ACU Funds (%) 
1976  I980  1985  1990  1992 
Total assets 
(million U.S.$) 
Uses of  funds 
Total assets 
1. Loans to nonbank 
customers 
2. Interbank funds 
a. Within  Singapore 
b. Outside Singapore 
3. Other assets 
Sources of  funds 
Total liabilities 
1. Deposits of nonbank 
2. Interbank funds 
customers 
a. Within Singapore 
b. Outside Singapore 
3. Other liabilities 
17,354.  I  54,392.6 
100.0  100.0 
25.3  22.8 
12.7  72.7 
19.4  20.3 
53.3  52.4 
2.0  4.5 
100.0  100.0 
11.3  17.0 
86.8  75.2 
21.6  20.7 
65.2  54.5 














390,395.5  355,378.6 
100.0  100.0 
32.2  35.4 
61.3  55.5 
11.1  11.5 
50.2  44.0 
6.6  9.  I 
100.0  100.0 
17.1  16.2 
79.3  80.0 
11.9  13.0 
67.4  67.0 
3.6  3.8 
Source: Anizual Report (Singapore: MAS, various issues). 
taxes on interest income.'  The other reason could be that Singapore was an 
important  funding center while  Hong  Kong  was  a  major  loan  syndication 
center. 
As in the London market, ACU transactions (including loans and deposits) 
are typically  short-term and are pegged  to the Singapore Interbank  Offered 
Rate (SIBOR).'OAs shown in table 13.3, transactions with maturity of less than 
one month constitute the largest categories  of both  assets and liabilities. In 
1992, about 20 percent of the ACU loans have maturity of more than one year, 
up from 16.7 percent in 1976. The trend toward longer maturity in loans may 
reflect the increased importance of medium-term syndicated loans. In contrast, 
the maturity structure of ACU deposits remained quite stable over the years, 
with deposits of longer than one year accounting for only 3-5  percent of the li- 
abilities. 
13.1.2  Asian Dollar Bond Market 
The Asian dollar bond market began in 1971 with the issue of U.S.$IO mil- 
lion by the Development Bank of Singapore. To encourage its development, 
the stamp duty on Asian dollar bonds was abolished in April 1980. Since then, 
9. Nonbank deposits in Hong Kong rose rapidly after 1982 when Hong Kong exempted nonresi- 
10. Nowadays, banks seldom quote the London  Interbank  Offered  Rate (LIBOR). With  the 
dents from the withholding tax on deposits. 
globalization of financial markets, there should be no difference between LIBOR and SIBOR. Table 13.3  Maturity Structure of ACU Assets and Liabilities (%) 
1976  1980  1985  1990  1992 
Maturity of Assets 
Total assets 
Less than 1 month 
1-3  months 
3-12  months 
Over 12 months 
Maturity of Liabilities 
Total liabilities 
Less than  1 month 
1-3  months 
3-1  2 months 



















































Source: Annual Report (Singapore: MAS, various issues). 
Table 13.4  Asian Dollar Bond Issues (million U.S. dollars) 
Number of 
Asian Dollar 
Year  Bond Issues 
New Issues in 
Asian Dollar  New International 
Bond Market  Bond Issues 
(A)  (B  )  (A)/@) 
1971  1 
1972  2 
I973  3 
I974  0 
1975  3 
1976  9 
1977  14 
1978  12 
I979  8 
1980  18 
1981  22 
1982  16 
1983  16 
1984  8 
1985  4 
1986  15 
1987  18 
1988  12 
1989  18 
I990  5 
1991  6 
1992  12 





































































Source: Annual Report (Basel: BIS, various issues). 366  Ngiarn Kee Jin 
the market has grown rapidly, although the level of  activity fluctuates  from 
year to year as can be seen in table 13.4. At the end of  1992, 222 issues had 
been floated, totaling some U.S.$15.8 billion. Most of the borrowers were from 
outside Singapore and comprise banks, multinational corporations, and gov- 
ernment. As in the Eurobond market, most of the Asian dollar bonds are de- 
nominated in U.S. dollars. Other currencies include the yen, Australian dollar, 
deutsche mark,  and European  Currency Unit  (ECU). In addition to straight 
fixed-rate issues, floating-rate notes, convertible bonds, and bonds with war- 
rants are issued in the Asian dollar bond market. Despite its impressive growth, 
it still forms less than 1 percent of the international bond market.” 
In recent years,  Singapore has played an important role in the region for 
raising funds for infrastructural and capital development (see MAS 1992,48). 
The growth in regional demand for funds has also been reflected  in higher 
syndicated loan and “dragon bond” activity in the Singapore capital market. In 
1992, a record 112 applications, amounting to U.S.$6.8 billion, were approved 
under the tax exemption scheme for syndicated offshore credit and underwrit- 
ing facilities. Almost all the syndicated facilities raised were denominated in 
U.S. dollars. In addition, Singapore banks have played an active role as lead 
managers for the launching of dragon bonds, which are debt instruments issued 
in Asia but outside Japan. These bonds are listed in at least two of the three 
regional centers-Singapore,  Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Since the launch of the 
first dragon bond by the Asian Development Bank in November 1991, 12 more 
issues  (with  one  issue  from China)  have  been  launched.  The outstanding 
amount in the dragon bond market now stands at more than U.S.$3 billion. 
13.1.3  Foreign Exchange Market 
The development of the foreign exchange (forex) market in Singapore can 
be traced back to the abolition of all foreign exchange controls in 1978.12  Fur- 
ther impetus to the market was given by the entry of  new foreign banks and 
international money brokers into Singa~0re.I~  It was also helped by deregula- 
tory measures taken by Japan in 1984 and 1985 that had the effect of increasing 
foreign exchange transactions in Japan and e1~ewhere.l~  As shown in figure 
13.3, the  market  has  expanded  nearly  sevenfold, from a  daily  turnover  of 
around U.S.$12 billion in 1985 to about U.S.$81 billion in 1992. Growth accel- 
erated after 1985. As a result, Singapore is currently ranked fourth in terms of 
average daily foreign exchange turnover, after London, New York, and Tokyo.I5 
11. The international bond markets consist of two broad groups: foreign bonds and Eurobonds. 
12. In June 1978, residents were finally allowed to borrow and lend freely in all currencies as 
well as deal freely in foreign exchange. 
13. Currently, there are  1 I5 foreign banks with either full, restricted, or offshore banking li- 
censes. Eight international money brokers now operate in Singapore. 
14. In 1984, Japanese dealers were allowed to make forward contracts freely and to deal with 
any parties outside Japan. In 1985, direct interbank dealings among banks in Japan were allowed. 
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Fig. 13.3  Average daily foreign exchange turnover in Singapore 
Source: Annual Report (Singapore: MAS, various issues). 
A major characteristic of  Singapore’s forex market is that it deals almost 
exclusively in U.S. dollars rather than Singapore dollars against all major cur- 
rencies. This is not  surprising, especially in view  of  its close link with the 
ADM and the MAS’S  desire to discourage the internationalization  of the Singa- 
pore dollar. In  1990, U.S. dollar-deutsche mark and U.S. dollar-yen  transac- 
tions accounted for 31 and 29 percent of total transactions, respectively.I6 The 
share of  Singapore-U.S. dollar tradings was only 5 percent. In  recent years, 
both the swap and forward markets have  been growing faster than the spot 
16. These are the latest statistics. 368  Ngiam Kee Jin 
market, although spot market transactions still account for over half of forex 
business.  In addition, cross-currency trading of the yen, deutsche mark, and 
British  pound  as well as trading of regional currencies  (e.g., the  Singapore 
dollar, Malaysian ringgit, Thai baht, and Indonesian rupiah) has become more 
active in the Singapore market. 
I 3.1.4  Singapore International Monetary Exchange 
Since its formation in 1984, the Singapore International Monetary Exchange 
(SIMEX) has grown to become one of the major futures and options exchanges 
in the world.ix  In recognition of its achievements, SIMEX was named the Inter- 
national Exchange of  the Year  by  the International Financing  Review three 
times (1989, 1992, and 1993). As of March  1993, SIMEX offered a total of 16 
futures and options contracts, which makes it the most diversified international 
futures and options exchange in Asia. The products it offers can be grouped as 
in table 13.5. 
The trading volume on SIMEX has grown spectacularly from only 538,829 
contracts in 1985 to about 12.2 million contracts in  1992, as shown in  figure 
13.4. The greatest increase occurred in  1992 when SIMEX’s trading volume 
soared by about 100 percent over the previous year. The most active contracts 
in  1992 were the Eurodollar futures (46.1 percent), Nikkei futures (27.5 per- 
cent), and Euroyen futures (20.4 percent). Among the interest rate futures con- 
tracts on SIMEX, only the Euromark futures contract is inactive. Since an ac- 
tive interest rate futures market is important for the development of the ADM, 
SIMEX should take appropriate measures to improve the liquidity of the Euro- 
mark futures contract. Perhaps, a linkup in the form of a Mutual Offset System 
with either the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) or 
March6 h Terme International de France (MATIF), which trade in Euromark 
futures, might boost the trading of this contract on SIMEX. Currently, four 
contracts-based  on Eurodollar,  deutsche mark, yen, and British  pound fu- 
tures-are  traded on the SIMEX-CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange) Mu- 
tual Offset System, established in  1984 as the first such system between two 
exchanges  in  the  world.  This innovative  system,  which  straddles two  time 
zones, allows trades initiated on either exchange to be liquidated in or trans- 
ferred to the other. 
13.1.5  Stock Exchange of Singapore 
One of the most significant developments in equity markets in the 1980s was 
the growing trend toward the trading of equities across frontiers. Singapore is 
no exception, as the  Stock Exchange of  Singapore (SES) started secondary 
listings of foreign shares in the late 1980s. As a result, the total market capital- 
17. Over-the-counter currency options trading is well developed in London but still in its in- 
18. SIMEX is still ranked seventeenth in the world in terms of volume of  business. 
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Table 13.5  SIMEX Products (as of March 1993) 





Eurodollar (1984)  Eurodollar (1987) 
Euroyen (1989)  Euroyen (  1990) 
Euromark (  1990) 
Yen (1984)  Yen (1987) 
Deutsche mark (1984) 
British pound (1986) 
Nikkei (1986)  Nikkei (1992) 
MSCI HK" (1993) 
HSFOb  (1989) 
Gasoil (1991) 
Gold (1984) 
Deutsche mark (1987) 
Note: Year in which contract was introduced is given in parentheses. 
'Morgan Stanley Capital International Hong Kong index. 
bHigh-sulfur fuel oil future. 
ization on the main board of  the SES has been increasing, as can be seen in 
figure 13.5.19  By 1992, it reached S$99.2 billion, which represented 1.3 times 
the size of  Singapore's GNP.20  Foreign counters accounted for only about 20 
percent of total market capitalization over the period 1988-92. 
All secondary listings of foreign stocks other than Malaysian stocks on the 
SES are denominated in non-Singapore currencies. Malaysian stocks traded on 
the SES are allowed to be denominated  in Singapore dollars. Recently, the 
SES has been actively encouraging the listing of Singapore depository receipts 
(SDRs),  which  are  the  local  equivalent  of  American  depository  receipts 
(ADRs).~'  This move is designed to increase the breadth of stocks available on 
the SES and to promote it as a regional securities market. However, except 
for the Malaysian and a few non-Malaysian foreign counters, the trading of 
secondary listings on the SES is practically nonexistent. In contrast, shares of 
local companies listed on the SES are actively traded, which can be attributed 
to a number of  measures taken by the authorities to help Singaporeans own 
shares of Singapore companies. The euphoria created by the biggest privatiza- 
tion  issue of  Singapore Telecom, the liberalization  of  the CPF Investment 
19. Companies on the main board are larger companies, while those listed on the second board, 
Sesdaq, are smaller. In 1990, the SES introduced an over-the-counter market, known as CLOB 
International, to allow investors to trade in a number of foreign securities listed on foreign stock 
exchanges. 
20. The figures for 1993 look even more impressive as the public issues of shares (excluding 
rights issues and private placements of listed shares) amounted to a record S$6.84 billion. Singa- 
pore Telecom accounted for about 60 percent of total funds raised. 
21. FT Gadjah Tunggal, an Indonesian manufacturing firm, was the first to list its SDRs on 
CLOB International in 1992. The latest to list its SDRs is Daimler-Benz, Germany's largest indus- 
trial conglomerate. 370  Ngiam Kee Jin 
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Fig. 13.4 
Source: Annual Report (Singapore:  SIMEX, various issues). 
Annual turnover on SIMEX (total and Eurodollar contracts) 
Scheme, and the unprecedented bull run in 1993 attracted many small investors 
to the local stockmarket.??  The SES was capable of handling such a huge vol- 
ume of trade mainly because it had implemented a scripless trading system.? 
In recent years, the SES has been following the worldwide trend by allowing 
greater use of  equity derivatives such as warrants, covered warrants, convert- 
ible bonds, and stock options. Currently, there are 37 warrants and only 2 cov- 
ered warrants listed on the SES. The trading of warrants is significantly more 
22. According to the latest survey conducted by  the SES, in 1991 Singaporeans held 89.9 per- 
23. The use of automated teller machines to purchase initial public offerings has helped to speed 
cent of the shares listed on the local bourse. 
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1991  1992 
Fig. 13.5 
Source: SES Journal (May 1993). 
Market capitalization in the Singapore stock market 
active than the trading of covered warrants because under existing SES regula- 
tions warrants can be traded by  any  investor whereas  covered  warrants can 
be traded only by  certain  investors.24 The trading of  stock options  made its 
reappearance on the SES in March 1993.2s  By the end of  that year, options on 
four local stocks were traded. However, the volume of trade in these options is 
still very anemic. 
24. Apart from financial institutions, only investors with net assets of  S$5 million or an annual 
25. The SES started stock option trading in 1977 but terminated it in early 1980  because of lack 
income of S$200,000  are allowed to trade in covered warrants. 
of interest. 372  Ngiarn Kee Jin 
13.2  Challenges Facing Singapore as a Financial Center 
Singapore has earned its reputation as Asia’s financial center by  building 
four strong, tightly integrated “pillars.” First, it has already established its posi- 
tion as a sophisticated offshore banking center that meets the increasing de- 
mand for loans to the rapidly expanding Asian countries by  borrowing from 
outside Asia as well as from neighboring countries. In particular, Singapore is 
well known as the home of the ADM. Second, it has overtaken Switzerland to 
become the fourth-largest foreign exchange center in the world. Third, SIMEX 
has set up dynamic derivative markets that thrive principally on instruments 
traded in the ADM and foreign exchange market. Fourth, the SES, which is 
probably the weakest of the four pillars, has recently taken some major initia- 
tives to establish Singapore as a hub for the region’s securities business. The 
challenge for Singapore is to strengthen all four pillars in order to enhance its 
role as an international financial center. 
13.2.1  Pillar 1: Asian Dollar Market 
Singapore’s position as the home of  the ADM has been vigorously chal- 
lenged in recent years by  many centers in Asia, particularly Hong Kong and 
Japan. The external environment facing Singapore changed dramatically dur- 
ing the 1980s, as evidenced by the establishment of the Japan Offshore Market 
(JOM) in 1986, the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in September 
1984, and the emergence of  China as an economic superpower in the latter 
half of the 1980s. The favorable conditions prevailing in northeast Asia have 
resulted in much faster growth of the offshore markets in both Hong Kong and 
Japan than in Singapore, as can be seen in figure 13.6. In  1986, Hong Kong 
overtook Singapore in terms of the size of the ADM and the Asian Dollar Bond 
issues. With the establishment of the JOM, Hong Kong has enjoyed a tremen- 
dous growth in transactions with Japan, especially in Euroyen interbank trans- 
actions. China’s insatiable demand for funds to fuel its development should 
lead to more loans from Hong Kong to nonbank customers in China. However, 
Hong Kong’s return to China in  1997 is still a cloud on the horizon. How 
Hong Kong will fare as a financial center depends very much on how China 
reestablishes its relationship with the outside world as well as on how the Sino- 
British Joint Declaration is carried out. 
Currently, Hong Kong and Singapore are regarded as two of the major off- 
shore centers in Asia. Despite the large size of the JOM, Tokyo does not seem 
to enjoy the same status. Singapore is popularly known as the “funding center” 
and Hong Kong as the “lending center”. With positive encouragement from 
its government, Singapore has also emerged as an important center for loan 
syndication.z6  In the Singapore market, developed under the close supervision 
of the MAS, there is a clear distinction between domestic and offshore transac- 
tions in order to insulate the domestic financial market from outside distur- 
26. In  1983, ACUs were granted a 10-year tax holiday for all income derived from syndicated 
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Fig. 13.6  Size of major offshore markets in Asia 
Sources: (a)  Monthly Digest of  Stutisfics (Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, various 
issues); (b) Monthly Bulletin (Tokyo: Bank of Japan, various issues); (c) Annual Report (Singa- 
pore: MAS, various issues). 
bances. The profits from offshore banking are taxed at a concessionary rate of 
10 percent as opposed to the 27 percent tax on profits from domestic banking. 
In contrast, Hong Kong, which has until recently followed a laissez-faire pol- 
icy,2' has no separation between offshore and domestic banking businesses. In 
Hong Kong, all profits, whether from domestic or offshore business, are cur- 
rently subject to a 16.5 percent tax.**  In this sense, Hong Kong is not a typical 
offshore market. 
With  its enormous economic and financial  strength, Tokyo should be  the 
natural financial center of the Asia-Pacific region. Within two years of its estab- 
lishment in 1986, the JOM overtook Singapore and now occupies the world's 
number-two spot behind London. The JOM may have caused a slowdown in 
the growth of Singapore's offshore market, but the Singapore foreign exchange 
27.  Departing  from  its  traditional  laissez-faire  principles,  Hong  Kong  took  measures  to 
strengthen its financial institutions by  introducing net worth ratio requirements (September  1988) 
and regulations on foreign exchange positions (July 1990). 
28. The offshore banking profits of  financial institutions were not taxed in  Hong Kong  until 
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market has certainly benefited from Japan’s financial liberalization. In the long 
run, Japan should not be a threat to Singapore because Singapore has its own 
market niche, unless further deregulation takes place in the JOM.29  Japan has 
a comparative advantage in long-term financing, especially in fulfilling China’s 
financial needs, while Singapore’s advantage lies in short- to medium-term fi- 
nancing for Southeast Asia. Barring serious political uncertainties, Hong Kong 
should remain unchallenged in short- to medium-term financing to northeast 
Asia, including China. 
13.2.2  Pillar 2: Foreign Exchange Market 
In recent years, Singapore has consolidated its position as an active and liq- 
uid forex center apart from its already established reputation as a major ADM. 
Although Singapore is currently the world’s fourth largest forex trading center, 
with an  average daily turnover of  over U.S.$SO billion, it is still a long way 
behind London, New York, and Tokyo. However, as shown in figure 13.7, Sin- 
gapore and Hong Kong are slowly chipping away at Tokyo’s position as Asia’s 
top forex center. The volume on the Tokyo market has hardly increased since 
the bubble economy years in Japan ended in  1990, despite the fact that the 
world’s forex turnover jumped by  some 45 percent  between  1989 and  1992. 
Meanwhile, the daily forex turnover in Singapore increased by 40 percent and 
in Hong Kong by 22 percent over the same period. Japan’s protracted recession 
coupled with the booming economies in other parts of Asia are increasingly 
inducing American and European banks to locate their forex operations in Sin- 
gapore and Hong Kong. 
Looking ahead, Singapore is likely to face keener competition from Hong 
Kong than from Tokyo. Unlike Tokyo, which is dominated by dollar-yen trad- 
ing, business in both Singapore and Hong Kong is more diversified.’O  More- 
over, the cost of doing banking business is lower in Singapore and Hong Kong 
than in Tokyo. In view of  these factors, Singapore should continue to play a 
key forex role in Asia despite Tokyo’s bigger forex market and its emergence 
as a world financial hub. To stay ahead of Hong Kong, Singapore must step up 
the trading of regional currencies and derivative products such as futures, for- 
ward rate agreements, interest rate swaps, and options.31  It should have no dif- 
ficulty in staying ahead in this game given its success in launching the SIMEX, 
ADM, and forex cash market. 
29. Currently, the JOM has too many restrictions. Only nonresidents and overseas subsidiaries 
can deposit and  borrow in  the offshore market. Securities businesses are prohibited. Offshore 
accounts, while not subject to withholding tax, still incur stamp duties and municipal taxes. More- 
over, offshore banking income still faces a stiff corporate tax rate of about 48 percent. 
30. Japan’s development is still lopsided as over 50 percent of the transactions in the JOM are 
denominated in yen. 
31. On January 25, 1994, the Business Times reported that two major European banks-Credit 
Suisse and Sociktk Generale-had  made Singapore their regional center for trading currency op- 




Source: Central Batik Survey of  Foreign Exchange Market Activiry (Basel: BIS, March 1993). 
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13.2.3  Pillar 3: Singapore International Monetary Exchange 
After experiencing slow growth in its first decade of operation, SIMEX has 
become  the  fastest-growing  futures  and  options  exchange.  SIMEX  is now 
“Asia’s one and only truly international derivative supermarket” (see Interna- 
tional  Financing Review  1993). However, its path to the top was not unob- 
structed as SIMEX had to face stiff competition from other exchanges and new 
technology developments such as Globex. The success of  SIMEX in the face 
of these challenges is a testimony to its competitiveness, efficiency, and inven- 
tiveness. 
Currently, there are 15 official financial and commodities futures exchanges 
in the Asia-Pacific  region.  Like SIMEX, most of  these regional  exchanges, 
such as the Sydney  Futures Exchange  (SFE), Tokyo International  Financial 
Futures Exchange (TIFFE), Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), Osaka Stock Ex- 
change (OSE), and Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE), have enjoyed re- 
cord trading volumes since 1988. These exchanges have been competing for a 
market share of the contracts traded at SIMEX.” For example, TIFFE trades 
in both  Eurodollar futures and Euroyen futures, which  are among the three 
most popular contracts traded at SIMEX. Nikkei 225 futures, the second most 
active contract on SIMEX, is traded at OSE.37 
In March 1992, the Japanese authorities introduced several measures to curb 
derivatives trading, particularly  index-linked arbitrage activity, which was be- 
32. The only exception is the HSFO contract which is traded only at SIMEX. 
33. SIMEX launched the Nikkei 225 in September 1986. Two years later, the OSE followed 
suit, and the TSE launched futures for the broader Tokyo Stock Price Index (Topix). 376  Ngiam Kee Jin 
lieved to have caused greater price volatility of Japanese stocks. The measures 
include tightening rules on index futures and options, raising margin require- 
ments, increasing brokerage commissions, shortening trading times, and forc- 
ing more disclosure of data on arbitrage. Even before the introduction of these 
new measures, SIMEX already had  several advantages over the OSE. First, 
SIMEX has longer trading hours and conducts trading on public holidays. Sec- 
ond, brokers’ commissions, margin requirements, and other charges at SIMEX 
are lower.34  With the new Japanese measures, the daily volume for Nikkei fu- 
tures in Osaka shrank to about 50,000 contracts from nearly 100,000  in 1991. 
In contrast, the daily volume for Nikkei futures on SIMEX rose to about 7,000 
contracts from about 2,500 the year before (Business  Times 1992). The rivalry 
between the two exchanges intensified in February 1994 when the OSE intro- 
duced another contract, Nikkei 300 stock index futures, to eventually replace 
the Nikkei 225 futures.35  In response, SIMEX announced in June 1994 that it 
would launch Nikkei 300 futures later in the year (Business  Times 1994). 
SIMEX has adopted the open outcry system that is currently used in the 
major futures exchanges in the world. In fact, the top six futures exchanges in 
1992 (which include three in the United States, one in the United Kingdom, 
one in France, and one in Brazil) use this system. The system’s main drawback 
is that it can be abused by floor  For instance, it can give rise to “syndi- 
cated trading,” in which traders collude to widen  spreads ahead of customer 
orders (see Straits Times 1993). The physical organization of open outcry trad- 
ing, in which the exact time sequencing of  all trades is not known ex post, 
makes it difficult for surveillance systems to detect any violations of rules. 
Trades executed during volatile market periods are especially susceptible to 
abuse. On the positive side, this system ensures that prices of futures contracts 
respond  sensitively  to  relevant  new  information.  Equilibrium  prices  are 
quickly established. Thus, the futures markets resemble closely the Walrasian 
auction system, in which no recontracting is allowed. 
Globex, the Chicago-based  electronic trading  system, has emerged  as an 
alternative  to  futures  trades  conducted  through  the  open  outcry  system. 
Launched in mid-1992, the 24-hour trading that Globex offers could take some 
business away from the open outcry system. How much of SIMEX’s business 
will eventually be diverted depends on whether Globex is able to provide unin- 
terrupted service, security, and superior liquidity. Critics contend that it will 
never be able to give the liquidity that is provided by the open outcry system. 
Only time will tell. Globex trading is already taking place in the Asian time 
34. E.g., in the case of calendar spreads (such as buying the March contract and simultaneously 
selling the June contract), charges are levied on both contracts at the OSE hut on a netted basis 
at SIMEX. 
35. While the Nikkei 225 represents the simple average of  225 component index  stocks, the 
Nikkei 300 is a weighted index-based  on market capitalization-which  tracks the performance 
of 300 stocks listed on the TSE. 
36. For a comprehensive treatment of  the abuses, see General Accounting Office (1989). 377  Singapore as a Financial Center 
zone as Globex terminals can be found in trading rooms in Tokyo and Hong 
Kong. However, Globex trading has thus far been very sluggish. For instance, 
the daily Eurodollar futures turnover by Globex is currently between 1,000 to 
2,000 lots. In contrast, the daily average volume of Eurodollar futures on SI- 
MEX was around 31,000 lots in February 1994. 
SIMEX should continue to play a key role in enhancing Singapore’s role as 
a financial center as long as it remains cost effective, responsive  to market 
needs, and innovative in introducing new products. The new products it plans 
to offer should reinforce the other three pillars that give support to Singapore’s 
position as a financial center. In this sense, SIMEX should concentrate on three 
core groups: interest rates, currencies, and stock indexes.”  There is tremen- 
dous scope for SIMEX to introduce futures on long-term debt instruments, 
regional currencies, and regional stock indexes.38  This is partly  because the 
increasing deregulation of financial markets in this region should result in an 
enlarged customer base for SIMEX. 
13.2.4  Pillar 4: Stock Exchange of Singapore 
Once a major stock market in Southeast Asia, the SES has recently been 
dwarfed by its counterpart in Malaysia. Thailand is also catching up fast as an 
important stock market in the region. Table 13.6 shows that among the Asian 
economies outside Japan, Hong Kong occupies the top spot with a market capi- 
talization of U.S.$293 billion, followed by Taiwan (U.S.$202 billion), Malay- 
sia  (U.S.$170  billion),  South  Korea  (U.S.$139  billion),  and  Singapore 
(U.S.$125 billion). The SES is expected to raise U.S.$2.5 billion worth of new 
funds in 1994, which represents only 2.0 percent of its market capitalization. 
All the other regional markets listed, with the exception of the Philippines, are 
expected to raise more equity capital than Singapore in 1994. 
With economies  growing faster in Asia  than  in other parts  of  the world, 
capital markets in the region can be expected to experience strong growth with 
the tapping of foreign capital. Keen competition among regional exchanges to 
convince regional companies to use their markets to raise capital is expected 
to intensify. With its strategic location and excellent infrastructure, Singapore 
is well placed to act as a capital market for the ASEAN region. At the moment, 
Singapore has a head start in this regional game plan on at least three counts. 
First, the SES has already put in place a high-technology settlement system, 
which is essential for playing the role of a regional market. Second, Singapore 
has been recognized as a center for the listing and trading of foreign stocks. 
Third, the membership of the SES includes several foreign stockbroking firms 
37. Perhaps the trading of commodity futures should be left to the newly created Singapore 
Commodity Exchange (SICOM), which currently trades only in rubber but will soon be launching 
Asia’s first coffee contract. 
38. Currently, SIMEX trades the Japanese government bond futures contract as well as in MSCI 
Hong Kong index futures, which mirror closely the widely watched Hang Seng index futures. 378  Ngiam Kee Jin 
Table 13.6  Market Capitalization and Estimated New Issues in Asian Stock 
Markets (billion U.S. dollars) 
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Source: Salomon Brothers, as reported in the Straits Times (May 28, 1994). 
that have helped raise the level of  sophistication of  the Singapore securities 
market. 
While  more  counters  and  derivatives  are  certainly  needed  on  the  local 
bourse, the SES must simultaneously seek an active trading environment for 
securities that are already listed. To  add depth to the local bourse, the SES 
should reassess brokerage fees and existing regulations, which might have dis- 
couraged trading in the Singapore market. Currently, brokerage fees in Singa- 
pore rank among the highest in the world. Singapore brokers impose graduated 
commission rates of between 0.5 (for transactions above S$l million) and  1 
percent  (for transactions below S$250,000). This compares unfavorably with 
negotiable fees in London and a fixed 0.5 percent in Hong Kong. 
While rules may, under certain circumstances, be needed to safeguard the 
interests of  investors, they cannot be so strict that they stifle innovation  and 
impede the growth of Singapore as a regional market. The requirement that 
foreign stocks other than Malaysian stocks listed on the SES be denominated 
in non-Singapore currency might have discouraged many local investors who 
would have to contend with foreign exchange risk. Another restrictive rule is 
that covered warrants on the SES can be traded only by  financial institutions 
and individuals with high net worth. Covered warrants thrive in other financial 
centers, such as Hong Kong, mainly because there are no restrictions on their 
trading. Relaxing this rule can only enhance Singapore’s regional role because 
it may pave the way for the introduction of covered warrants on regional stocks. 
Thus, unless remedial actions are taken, the inactivity of these securities can 
undermine Singapore’s efforts to become a regional market, as foreign compa- 
nies considering the SES may be discouraged from seeking secondary listings 
on the SES. Worse still, foreign companies now on the SES may  be tempted 
to delist. 
Any new instruments introduced by the SES should not only be in demand 
by investors but also help to consolidate Singapore’s position as a center for 
securities business. In this respect, the SES or SIMEX should launch a futures 379  Singapore as a Financial Center 
contract on a local stock index and, at a later stage, a stock index options  con- 
tract.39  Hong Kong has been successful with the trading of futures and options 
on its Hang Seng index. By providing a useful hedging mechanism to invest- 
ors, such futures and options contracts should make Singapore a more attrac- 
tive place for investors and fund managers.4O The task of underwriters of stocks 
would become easier and safer because they can use these derivative instru- 
ments to hedge the market risk.41 
13.3  Prospects for Singapore as a Financial Center 
The rapid developments in the Asia-Pacific region in the past decade greatly 
enhanced the  importance of Singapore and Hong Kong as leading  financial 
centers in Asia. These two city-states have benefited from the opening-up of 
China, the growing prosperity  in the ASEAN economies,  and the increased 
flow of funds from advanced countries (the United States, Japan, and Europe) 
to the Asia-Pacific region. Hong Kong has played a vital role as the gateway to 
China, and Singapore to ASEAN. As the ASEAN economies are expected to 
continue growing and to further liberalize their financial markets, there is tre- 
mendous scope for Singapore to play an even greater role as a major financial 
center. Although new financial centers in this  region  (Bangkok, Taipei, and 
Labuanj have been trying to secure a share of the offshore banking business, 
Singapore’s position in the next decade should not be adversely  affected as 
it still will have certain advantages, which include political stability, a well- 
developed infrastructure, a highly skilled workforce, and a strategic location. 
The challenge for Singapore is to maintain its competitive edge in the longer 
term. 
The kind of financial services provided by Singapore may, however, undergo 
some changes in view of the changing external environment and the judicious 
effort Singapore has made to carve specific niches for itself. For example, ACU 
growth will probably be constrained on account of two external developments. 
First, banks throughout the world are required to adopt a common capital ade- 
quacy req~irernent,~~  which tends  to favor the  flow of funds through  direct 
finance rather than indirect finance (see figure 13.1).  Second, the other regional 
financial centers are providing direct competition to Singapore with attractive 
tax packages to boost their share of ACU business.j3 
However, Asia’s booming economies coupled with their need to build mas- 
39. Only stock index options rather than options on individual stocks can complete the market. 
40. Since short selling is disallowed in Singapore, the only way an investor can hedge his stock 
portfolio is through the futures and options markets. 
41. Because of the absence of a suitable hedging device in Singapore, underwriters can resort 
to a “force majeure” clause which allows them to withdraw their commitments under adverse 
market conditions. 
42. Under BIS guidelines, banks are required to have capital equivalent to at least 8 percent of 
their assets. 
43. Taiwan went even further than Singapore by  granting tax exemption to bank profits from 
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sive infrastructural and manufacturing projects will provide new opportunities 
for regional financial centers such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan.44  Ac- 
cording to the Asian Development Bank, Asia’s developing countries will grow 
by 7.2 percent in 1994 and 199.5, while global growth will be only 1.8 percent 
in  1994 and 3 percent in  199.5. Estimates  of infrastructure  spending in Asia 
seem to be clustered around U.S.$1..5  trillion over the next  10  year^."^ As a 
result, there will be an increase in demand for such services as fund raising, 
fund management,  and risk management, which Singapore is well equipped 
to provide. 
With the viability and depth of its financial markets, Singapore could play a 
particularly useful role in mobilizing the large amounts of funds required by 
the Asian countries. In this respect, the bond market in Singapore is likely to 
be the main beneficiary for two reasons. First, with its strategic location, Singa- 
pore will be an important supplier of funds through Asian dollar bonds to coun- 
tries in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Second, as China’s needs 
may be too enormous for Hong Kong to meet, Singapore should enjoy a “spill- 
over” effect because of its close link with China, especially at the governmen- 
tal level. The development of industrial parks in China by the two governments 
should help strengthen existing ties between the two  There is thus 
tremendous scope for Singapore to serve as the second gateway to China. After 
the successful launching of Singapore’s dragon bonds worth U.S.$300 million 
in October 1993, China may increasingly turn to this source of  finance for its 
major infrastructural projects. 
However, Asia’s companies may find Singapore an unattractive place to raise 
equity  capital  in  view  of  the  general  lack  of  interest  in  the  foreign  (non- 
Malaysian) shares listed on the SES. The fact that such shares must be denomi- 
nated in non-Singapore currency might have deterred many local investors, and 
probably  some fund managers, from trading in them because they involve a 
currency risk in addition to the risk associated with equity investment. In con- 
trast, Malaysian shares listed on the SES are actively traded  partly  because 
they are denominated in Singapore  dollar^.^' Similarly, the H shares of Chinese 
state enterprises listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, which are denomi- 
nated  in Hong Kong dollars, have a liquid market. Encouraged by  the initial 
44. Recently, the Singapore government took  the lead by  investing U.S.$250 million in the 
U.S.$l billion AIG (American International Group) Asian Infrastructure Fund. 
45. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific estimated [hat Asia will 
require approximately U.S.$140  billion per year to develop its infrastructure. The International 
Finance Corporation calculated that third-world nations will need about U.S.$150 billion annually 
for private infrastructure projects in the 1990s. 
46. Currently, two joint ventures in China have been  agreed upon. The Suzhou township will 
cover 70 sq. km. and is a 35:65 joint venture between the Suzhou govcrnrnent and a Singapore 
consortium led by the Keppel Group. The Wuxi Industrial Park, which will cover 1,000 hectares, 
is being developed by a 30:70  joint venture between the Wuxi government and a Singapore consor- 
tium’led by  the Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation. 
47. The other reason may be that Singaporeans are familiar with the Malaysian counters. 381  Singapore as a Financial Center 
success of these H shares, more Chinese state enterprises will soon be listing 
their shares in Hong Kong. 
After many years of official encouragement, Singapore has finally become 
a major fund management center like Switzerland and Hong Kong. Singapore 
has several attractions for the fund management industry. First, it is situated in 
a fast-growing region that should continue to attract funds from the United 
States and Europe for higher returns and diversification. Second, it has a thriv- 
ing market for regional stocks, particularly Malaysian shares listed on the SES 
and Thai shares, which are  Third, it provides a broad range of deriv- 
ative  products  for  fund  managers  to  hedge  their  exposure  in  this  region. 
SIMEX currently trades in futures and options on the Nikkei 225 as well as 
futures on the MSCI Hong Kong Index  and will be expanding the range of 
derivative  products  to  include  other  Asian  equity  index  futures  contracts. 
Fourth, it provides generous fiscal incentives whereby fees earned by approved 
fund managers are taxed at only 10 percent.49  As a result, the amount of funds 
managed in Singapore has increased fivefold over the last four years. In 1993, 
the total pool of funds managed by the 82 approved fund managers in Singa- 
pore reached a record high of S$61.8 billion (see Straits Times 1994). Never- 
theless, there is still scope for growth as this sum represents only a small frac- 
tion of the total funds handled by fund managers worldwide.'" 
Several measures taken by Singapore in recent years to increase the sophisti- 
cation and diversity of its financial market should enhance its role as a risk 
management center. First, incentives  are available for multinational corpora- 
tions  (MNCs),  including  banks,  to  set up  operational  headquarters  (OHQ) 
in Singapore. Several MNCs with operations in the region have already used 
Singapore  to  carry  out  their  regional  treasury  activities  under  the  OHQ 
~cheme.~'  Second, the introduction of  derivatives of more regional debt and 
equity products should provide corporations with additional tools for manag- 
ing their financial risk. Finally, the MAS has introduced tax incentives to en- 
courage financial institutions to undertake financial engineering and financial 
R&D in Singap~re.~~  Collectively, these measures are powerful attractions to 
ensure that  Singapore will remain  a leading center for risk management  in 
the region. 
48. The trading of unlisted regional stocks in Singapore amounted to some S$41.5 billion in 
49. In addition, all income earned by  nonresidents is exempt from tax. 
50. The amount of funds invested in the Asia Pacific region, excluding Japan, is estimated at 
only 5 percent of the total funds managed by international fund managers. 
5 1. Under this scheme, income derived from trading in foreign exchange, financial futures, and 
other treasury support activities conducted by an MNC for a group of companies in the region will 
be taxed at a concessionary rate of  10 percent. 
52. Introduced in June 1992, the tax  incentives are in the form of double tax  deduction for 
qualifying expenses relating to the establishment and development of new skill and knowledge- 
intensive financial activities in Singapore. 
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13.4  Conclusions 
Singapore has become a major financial center of  international repute. Its 
foreign exchange market is now the fourth-largest and SIMEX is among the 
fastest-growing futures and options exchanges in the world. However, ACU 
business in Singapore has not been growing as rapidly as in Hong Kong and 
Tokyo. Looking ahead, ACU business, which is basically conventional banking 
service, will  face greater competition  from such emerging financial centers 
in the region as Taipei, Bangkok, and Labuan. However, with flexibility and 
innovativeness, Singapore should be able to face the challenges and stay ahead. 
Singapore’s status will be similar to that of London, which continues to be the 
financial  capital of  Europe despite the development of  Frankfurt and other 
cities. 
The robust Asian economies coupled with the enormous financial require- 
ments of their infrastructure and investment projects should provide a tremen- 
dous potential for the growth of  the financial centers in the region. With its 
strategic  location  and  well-developed  financial  market,  Singapore  is  well 
poised  to provide  the  more  sophisticated  financial  services, particularly  in 
fund-raising, fund management, and risk management. However, it must watch 
developments in other financial centers to ensure that it is not hamstrung by its 
own regulations. The most contentious regulation has always been the restric- 
tion on the issuance of Singapore dollar-denominated  securities by foreigners 
or by  Singaporeans who intend to use the proceeds  outside Singapore. This 
restriction is supposed to prevent the internationalization of the Singapore dol- 
lar, which can have a destabilizing effect on the domestic money  supply or 
exchange rate. The cost is that the domestic (or onshore) financial markets in 
Singapore will not be as fully developed as in, say, Switzerland, which has 
allowed the Swiss franc to be internationalized. 
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Comment  Sang-Woo Nam 
This paper provides a lot of factual information about the financial center of 
Singapore. I agree that a well-trained workforce together with accumulated 
expertise, credible supervisory  capability, and political  stability are the im- 
portant advantages of Singapore as a financial center. I am also convinced that 
the Singapore financial market is likely to find a niche as a risk management 
and fund management center as well as a fund supplier through Asian dollar 
bonds to countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. 
Sang-Woo Nam is a senior fellow at the Korea Development Institute. 384  Ngiam Kee Jin 
My first comment is about the future of Singapore as a financial center. First 
of all, we cannot help comparing Singapore with Hong Kong. Hong Kong will 
continue to play the major role in taking care of the financing needs of north- 
east Asia, including China, Vietnam, and Korea, while Singapore will do more 
business with the ASEAN countries. Since the northeast Asian economies are 
likely to grow much faster than the ASEAN countries, the potential demand 
for financial services to be met by Hong Kong’s financial center is also going 
to grow much faster than that for Singapore’s. Although Singapore’s financial 
center may aim to become “the second gateway” to China, this role may  be 
limited. 
Of course, the future of Hong Kong is uncertain. However, recent develop- 
ments seem to indicate that this uncertainty has been substantially reduced, at 
least in the short and medium run. Two-way investment between Hong Kong 
and China is enormous, including real estate purchases. Their interests have 
been interlocked by  taking each other hostage. In  the long run, Shanghai or 
Hainan might share the role of  Hong Kong as a financial center, which may 
not have any significant impact on the Singapore financial market. 
In addition, deregulation in the Japan Offshore Market (JOM) will affect the 
growth of  Singapore’s financial center. As the author notes, the JOM is only 
for nonresidents, and securities businesses are prohibited. Furthermore, the tax 
burden on offshore accounts and offshore banking income in the JOM is fairly 
heavy. With continued progress in domestic financial liberalization in Japan, 
the JOM may  see gradual deregulation in business boundaries  and in other 
respects.  This will tend  to divert  some business from  Singapore and  Hong 
Kong to the JOM. 
My second comment concerns the long-run underlying trend for offshore 
financial activities in general. With continued financial liberalization, which 
relaxes many of the regulations on banking activities, and the global integra- 
tion of financial markets where foreign banks operate in a much freer environ- 
ment, local (onshore) banks are likely to absorb much of current offshore activ- 
ities. Moreover, with the development of computers and telecommunication 
technologies, the physical location of an international financial center is not as 
important as it has been in the past. The gravity of a financial center is becom- 
ing functional rather than locational. 
My  final comment is related  to the impact of  increasing external capital 
flows on the macroeconomic  stability of a country. With the liberalization of 
capital transactions and the introduction of  the Asian Currency Unit market, 
Singapore must have faced increasing capital mobility. I wonder to what extent 
it undermined Singapore’s monetary independence and macroeconomic stabil- 
ity. As a means of insulating the domestic financial market from outside distur- 
bances, Singapore banks are required to make a clear distinction between do- 
mestic and offshore transactions. With transferrable deposit instruments and 
other innovations, the separation might have been incomplete. The experience 
of Singapore with capital account liberalization might provide a valuable les- 385  Singapore as a Financial Center 
son for other countries such as Korea, which is in the process of  seriously 
opening the capital account. 
Comment  Pakorn Vichyanond 
From my viewpoint, Ngiam’s paper is truly impressive in that, given its length, 
it provides a very comprehensive picture of developments in  Singapore as a 
financial center. Essential facets, or pillars as he calls them, are well contained. 
Nevertheless, let me add a few points. 
First, we should probably be cautious before claiming that deregulation or 
financial liberalization will definitely encourage cross-border capital flows or 
strengthen the prospects of any city like Singapore as a financial center. The 
key point is what we are referring to in the term “deregulation” or “financial 
liberalization.” If we mean fewer capital or exchange controls, its contribution 
to the development of an international financial center may be positive. But if 
we mean less stringent controls on access to local markets, that is, that tapping 
local funds from local capital markets is easier than before (which is applicable 
to Thailand), then chances are slimmer that local companies will tap funds 
from abroad or an international financial center like Singapore. The primary 
reason for reverting to home markets is exchange risk. 
Risk aversion to exchange rate variations is well known and also endorsed 
by Ngiam. That is, local investors in Singapore are generally reluctant to buy 
securities issued by  foreigners on the Stock Exchange of  Singapore mainly 
because those securities must be denominated in non-Singapore currency. The 
same feeling is true on the other side of the coin. That is, when foreign borrow- 
ers such as the ones in Thailand can choose between tapping funds from either 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand in baht or Singapore’s Asian Dollar Market in 
nonbaht currencies, Thai borrowers are ordinarily tempted to tap funds from 
local sources, especially their stock market. Therefore, an increasing degree of 
deregulation or financial liberalization does not necessarily lead to the prosper- 
ity of international financial centers. Its largely depends on specific aspects of 
such deregulation or liberalization. 
Evidence from several markets supports my viewpoint, that is, that deregula- 
tion can lead to more direct financing and less dependence on offshore money 
markets. An example is the case of corporate bonds covered by Horiuchi amid 
the widespread issuances of notes and warrants on the Stock Exchange of Thai- 
land after the newly established Securities and Exchange Commission (1 992) 
implemented several relaxing measures for the stock market. (If my concern 
is taken into account, there are some implicit paradoxes in Ngiam’s paper.) 
My second point concerns offshore rivals of Singapore, such as Thailand’s 
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Bangkok International Banking Facilities and Malaysia's Labuan. Because of 
their proximity, they represent formidable challenges to Singapore as banking 
centers accommodating the financial needs arising from the emergence of the 
economic quadrangle among Thailand, China, Burma, and Laos. 
Finally, I  would like to investigate the genuine intention of the Monetary 
Authority of  Singapore (MAS) in preventing the internationalization  of  the 
Singapore dollar. Ngiam is correct that such a shut-in policy is costly in hinder- 
ing Singapore's development as an international financial center. But our sec- 
ond thoughts easily support the MAS, since such restriction will help preserve 
financial stability and minimize disturbances from external sources. In other 
words, avoiding the internationalization of the Singapore dollar may help retain 
the current degree of  MAS autonomy or independence, if there is indeed any 
such thing. 